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ACQUISITION ACTIVITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK
Prior literature suggests that degree of organizational slack
influences strategic decisions, such as acquisition. We report
empirical research testing that proposition. Using regression
analysis on Compustat data, we examine relationships between
organizational slack prior to acquisition and level of corporate
acquisition activity. Results are counter to expectations based in
prior literature.

Each of the two concepts on which this paper focuses,
organizational slack and acquisition, have been acknowledged as
important in the field of strategic management and have received a
great deal of attention from researchers. Review of the streams of
research on each of these phenomena demonstrates the need for study
of the relationship between these concepts. Writers on
organizational slack suggest that slack is related to major
corporate decisions such as acquisition. Empirical research has
not yet been done to test that relationship. Similarly,
acquisition is broadly acknowledged by managers and researchers to
be an important strategic decision, yet the research literature t o
date reports few tests of possible explanants of acquisition
behavior
.
This paper contributes to the research streams on these two
important topics. In the case of organizational slack, the
theoretical development has been extensive, but empirical research
which tests relationships suggested in conceptual papers has not
kept pace. Acquisition, on the other hand, has been the focus of
much empirical research. However, that stream of empirical work
has primarily sought to evaluate post-acquisition changes in
shareholder value, measuring gains and losses to acquirers and
acquirees. Little empirical attention has been given to
understanding acquisition decision behavior and the influences on
it. The study reported in this paper thus addresses important gaps
in two active research streams.
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LITERATURE BACKGROUND
A definition of organizational slack synthesized from prior
work is given in Bourgeois (1981):
"Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential
resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully
to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures
for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in
strategy with respect to the external environment." (p. 30)
Bourgeois examines definitions of slack from prior conceptual
research, as well as types of strategic behaviors likely to be
facilitated by the presence of slack, and proposes measures for
operational i zi ng the organizational slack concept in future
research. This conceptual contribution is refined by Bourgeois and
Singh (1983), who partition slack into three types: available,
recoverable and potential. They suggest measures of those slack
types which can be drawn from public data sources; their proposed
measures are used in the research reported here.
Slack has also been considered, primarily as an independent
variable, in a number of empirical studies, testing its relation to
profit growth rate (Wolf, 1971), sophistication of human resource
management policies ( Dimick and Murray, 1978), unit interdependency
and information flow (Kmetz, 1980), earnings variation (Marino and
Lange, 1982), political behavior in strategic decision-making of
top management teams (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983), and as a
mediating effect on risk-taking in strategic decisions (Singh,
1983) .
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A study by Marino and Lange (1983) considers measures of slack
used in other empirical work, classifying them by type of measure
(objective or perceptual) and by standards against which they are
compared (absolute or relative). Although perceptual measures of
slack are mentioned by Bourgeois (1981) and used by Kmetz (1980),
Bourgeois proposes use of public financial records as a first cut
at detecting slack in organizations. Such objective measures,
drawing data from Compustat (Marino and Lange, 1982) and from
firms' annual reports (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983), are used in most
other studies cited above. Although absolute standards (firm slack
compared to prior time periods) have been most frequently used
(Wolf, 1971; Dimick and Murray, 1978; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983),
relative standards (firm slack compared to industry average) are
more appropriate for some research questions (Marino and Lange,
1983) and have been used by Marino and Lange (1982) and Singh
( 1983) .
In their discussions of organizational slack, a number of
writers have suggested that slack influences firms' willingness and
ability to behave creatively, pursue innovation, offer new
products, enter new markets (Hambrick and Snow, 1977; Dimick and
Murray, 1978; Bourgeois, 1981). Acquisition might be viewed as a
type of innovation which could be considered in the presence of
slack resources, or as a means to the ends of offering new products
or entering new markets. Dimick and Murray note that the
"...influence of si ack . . .make ( s ) various types of policy
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affordable" ( 1978 : 620 ) . Further support for the value of empirical
research on the relationship of slack and strategic decisions such
as acquisition can be found in Bourgeois' statement:
"Finally, if we can in fact ascertain from public financial
data that changes in slack antecede such strategic behaviors
as product innovation or introduction or aggressive entry
into related markets, then we will have developed a
powerful competitive intelligence tool for strategic
managers . " ( 1981 :39)
The literature on acquisition, however, sheds little light on
the antecedents of or influences on acquisition decision behavior.
Much of the empirical research on acquisition has focused on the
financial rewards of acquisition from the perspective of
shareholders. Reported primarily in finance journals, that
research is nicely summarized for its relevance to strategic
management issues by Lubatkin (1983), and will not be discussed
here. Other recent work on acquisition has addressed situational
characteristics associated with acquisition success (Burgman, 1983;
Kusewitt, 1985). Organizational slack and other influences on
acquisition decision behavior have not been empirically examined.
MODEL
This study tests the relationship between acquisition activity
and organizational slack using a multiple measure model of
organizational slack proposed by Bourgeois and Singh (1983), and
operational izes those slack variables in a way consistent with
other authors on slack. The slack measures are the independent
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variables in the regression equation, and acquisition (as a percent
of assets, to adjust £or firm size) is the dependent variable.
Adjusting for firm size is consistent with other work on
organizational slack ( Dimick and Murray, 1978; Marino and Lange,
1982) and is particularly important for our research question in
view of the importance of size in a recent study of correlates of
acquisition volume and frequency ( Duhaime and Davis, 1985).
The general model initially proposed for this research
follows. The sign of each coefficient indicates the hypothesized
direction of the relationship between that variable and level of
acquisitions
.
Y = bc + b, RE - b 2 DIV + b3 LIQ + bv REC + b^-INV + b^ S GA
-b,DE + b^-PE + e
where Y = acquisitions in period t as a percent of assets in
period t-
1
RE = A (retained earnings as a percent of assets)
DIV = A (dividends as a percent of net worth)
LIQ = & (liquidity as a percent of sales)
REC = A (accounts receivable as a percent of sales)
INV = a (inventory as a percent of sales)
SGA = A (sales, general and administrative expenses
as a percent of sales)
DE = A (debt/equity ratio)
PE = A (price/earnings ratio)
e = error term
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In the regression analysis which follows, the independent variables
are measured relative to a standard. First, we study slack's
relation to acquisition by comparing the firms' levels of the
above-mentioned independent variables in the year before
acquisition to their levels in the prior year. Thus the dependent
variable for period (t) is related to the difference in the
independent variables f( t-1 ) -( t-2)J . Then, we examine slack's
relation to acquisition by comparing the firms' levels of the
independent variables to the industry average levels, both for the
year before acquisition. Thus acquisition for period (t) is
related to the difference in the independent variables j^firmlt-l) -
industry average ( t-1 W .
SAMPLE
The sample consisted of all Fortune 500 firms whose data
reported on Compustat included acquisitions for at least one year
in the 1972-1984 period. The resulting sample was 303 firms and
approximately 1300 observations, as not all firms had acquisitions
in every year. We used Fortune 500 firms because past surveys of
acquisition activity have observed that a large proportion of
acquisitions are made by a small number of large firms (Federal
Trade Commission, 1980:111).
We excluded firms which had made no acquisitions, on the
belief that, for the purposes of this research question, such firms
are substantively different from firms which had made even one
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acquisition. Similar to the Hofer and Chrisman (1984) first
diversification notion, we believe that factors such as basic
willingness to acquire, rather than organizational slack, dominate
such firms' decisions to make no acquisitions. We used the period
1972-1984 because reporting of acquisition data on Compustat began
in 1971 and is quite spotty for that first year. We decided to use
all available years (1972-1984) in order to include various states
of the general economic environment; choosing a subperiod would
have been arbitrary and might have biased our results.
METHODS
Based on the prior literature on organizational slack (cited
above), we expected that acquisition would be related to the
presence of organizational slack. An ordinary least squares
regression was used to test the model proposed by Bourgeois and
Singh (1983), with acquisition (adjusted for acquiring firm's size)
as the dependent variable and the suggested components of slack as
independent variables. The use of multiple measures of
organizational slack, as seen in the Bourgeois and Singh model, is
supported by Bourgeois (1981) and Marino and Lange (1983).
Bourgeois and Singh discussed three types of slack: available,
recoverable and potential. In this research, we examined
acquisition's relationship to slack types individually as well as
to slack types taken together.
Data for all variables were obtained from Compustat.
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Selection of Compustat line items to operational i ze the variables
was straightforward except for "General and Administrative
expense," unavailable on Compustat; we adopted the modification
proposed by Marino and Lange (1983) and used "Selling, General and
Administrative expense." Table 1 shows the variables used in the
regression equation and the Compustat variables and line item
numbers from which they were calculated.
Insert Table 1 About Here
By themselves, the raw measures listed in Table 1 give little
indication of how much slack a firm has; it is only in comparison
to some standard that these variables can be viewed as indicators
of slack. Two types of standards have been used in prior research
on slack, firms compared to themselves (resource levels over time)
and firms compared to other firms in their industries (resource
levels compared to average industry levels). Research questions
which focus on slack resource deployment, such as acquisition,
should be addressed with slack measured relative to other firms
(Marino and Lange, 1983). As we are testing a relationship
suggested by Bourgeois and Singh, we first report results using
firm compared to prior period measures of slack, as they used.
Then, we show what results are obtained when slack is measured on a
firm compared to industry average basis.
Industry averages are calculated on industries defined by
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two-digit SIC codes. In the regression analysis, we use listwise
deletion of missing data. This approach is more conservative and
rigorous than pairwise deletion.
RESULTS
Firm Slack Compared to Prior Time Period
First, we inspected the correlation coefficients (see Table 2)
and found very low intercorrel ation of the variables,
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
except that two of the recoverable slack variables, receivables and
inventory, are inversely correlated with liquidity (-.45 and -.48,
respectively) . Either liquidity or the other two variables should
therefore be removed from the equation. Given the research
question we are addressing (the relationship of acquisition to
organizational slack), recoverable slack seems far less likely to
be tapped to finance acquisitions than does available slack such as
cash and short-term securities. We therefore removed recoverable
slack from the model; analysis and discussion will center on
available slack, potential slack, and the combination of the two.
The equation relating acquisition to organizational slack was
1. Correlations of all variables taken together are shown here.
Tables of correlation coefficients for each of the other equations
may be obtained from the authors. They show intercorrel at ions very
similar to those in Table 2.
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first estimated using firm compared to prior period measures of
slack. Table 3 shows the best fitting specifications of this
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
model, giving the signs, magnitude and significance of the
coefficients of independent variables. The regression results
indicate that organizational slack (measured as firm compared to
prior period) explains very little acguisition activity (the
coefficient of determination, r 2 , is approximately .01 for all
eguations). This is an important finding because of the strong
theoretical justification in prior literature for a relationship
between these phenomena (acquisition and organizational slack).
Using the F statistic, the available slack equation (1) is shown to
have high statistical significance (p=.001). The coefficients of
retained earnings and liquidity are positively signed, as expected,
and are statistically significant, suggesting that acquisition is
related to increases in firms' retained earnings and to
improvements in their liquidity ratios. Liquidity has higher
statistical significance than retained earnings, but their beta
2
values are virtually equal. The third component of available
slack, dividends/net worth, does not have the expected negative
sign, but its coefficient is not statistically significant.
2. Not shown here because of space limitations, but available from
the authors.
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In the case of potential slack (equation 2), debt/equity ratio
is negatively signed, as expected, but price-earnings ratio does
not have the expected positive sign. However, neither the equation
nor the coefficients of its independent variables are statistically
significant, thus no relationship is suggested between firms' year-
to-year comparisons on those ratios and their acquisition
activity. It is interesting to note that recent research on a
related phenomenon, divestment, tested an hypothesized relationship
to firms' debt/equity ratios (compared to prior years) and found no
relation ( Duhaime and Grant, 1984). When available and potential
slack measures are examined together in relation to acquisition
(equation 3), the results are consistent with those obtained in the
separate slack equations.
On the basis of this regression analysis, we conclude that
organizational slack, when measured as firm compared to prior
periods, explains very little of overall acquisition activity.
Although the explanatory power of slack variables with respect to
acquisition is very small, the relatively high level of
significance obtained implies that the explained relationship is
fairly consistent. Further, it appears that available slack is of
greater interest than potential slack in relation to acquisition
questions, and that two variables dominate, retained earnings and
1 iquidi ty
.
As noted above, we believe that measuring organizational slack
in relation to industry averages is most meaningful for research
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questions dealing with acquisition. Regression results using firm
compared to industry average measures of organizational slack will
be presented next.
Firm Compared to Industry Average
As shown in Table 4, intercorrelation among the variables
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
remains very low when organizational slack is measured by comparing
firms' financial characteristics to their industries' average
financial characteristics. Table 5 shows the best fitting
specifications of the regression equations when
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
firm compared to industry average measures of slack are examined
against acquisition activity.
The regression results indicate that organizational slack
measured relative to industry averages, although probably more
appropriate for a research question on acquisition, does not have
more explanatory power about acquisition activity than did
organizational slack measured as firm compared to prior periods.
The coefficient of determination, r"2-, is still approximately .01.
Similar to the firm compared to prior period results, the F
statistics show the available slack equation to be highly
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significant. The coefficient of retained earnings again has the
expected positive sign and high statistical significance.
Liguidity still has the expected positive sign, but does not meet
usual standards of statistical significance (p=.16). Dividends/net
worth has a non-significant positive coefficient, as before.
It is interesting to note that when industry average measures
are used, the overall regression eguation of potential slack on
acguisition proves to be statistically significant (p=.07), as it
was not significant using firm compared to prior period measures of
slack. This suggests that recognition of the existence of
potential slack occurs when the firm has a higher level of such
resources relative to the rest of the industry. Debt/eguity ratio
has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant.
The divestment study cited in the previous section (Duhaime and
Grant, 1984) did not examine debt/eguity ratios in relation to
industry average ratios, thus no comparison can be drawn here. The
coefficient of price/earnings ratio has the expected positive sign
but is not statistically significant, similar to the results
obtained with firm compared to prior period measures of slack.
When available and potential slack indicators are examined
together in relation to acguisition, all variables except
dividends/net worth are signed as expected, and the coefficients of
both retained earnings and debt/eguity ratio are statistically
significant. The estimating eguation is highly significant
(p=.002), but the coefficient of determination is very small (r is
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less than .02). As was found with slack of firms compared to prior
periods, slack of firms compared to industry averages explains
little of the variance in levels of acquisition activity, yet the
small proportion explained has high statistical significance.
While liquidity appeared important when internal standards (firm
compared to prior periods) are used to measure slack, debt/equity
ratio carries more weight when external standards (firm compared to
industry average) are used.
DISCUSSION
Prior literature suggests that a relationship between
organizational slack and acquisition activity is likely, yet
results based on our sample and data do not support that
proposition. Neither immediately available nor potentially
obtainable financial resources of firms seem to rank among the
primary criteria on which acquisition decisions are based.
While the various measures of slack proposed in the model
tested here seem to be the best and most comprehensive ones
available, it appears that their relation to acquisition does not
hold as hypothesized. Although organizational slack accounts for a
very small proportion of the variance in acquisition activity, the
portion accounted for is fairly consistent, implying that slack is
a consideration in acquisition decisions but not a dominant
factor. While suggestions that firms which have slack can "afford"
to pursue creative strategies are intuitively plausible, our
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results suggest that lack of slack resources is not necessarily an
insurmountable barrier for firms which are determined to acquire.
If low slack on some indicators is a factor which firms can
overcome, that may account for the low r values in this study's
resul ts.
The regression analysis produced more highly significant
results when slack was measured in comparison to industry average
standards, a more theoretically defensible comparison for this
research question, than when comparison to prior time periods was
used. Given that industry conditions may change and affect the
acceptable range of parameters such as debt/equity ratio for that
industry, comparison to industry averages may be more meaningful to
firms faced with acquisition decisions. To the extent that firms
look at industry averages, over time the absolute amounts of slack
required by those organizations would change with fluctuations in
industry conditions, producing differing results when an indicator
of slack is viewed by internal and external standards, as seen in
this paper.
Several limitations of this study must be recognized to fully
understand both these results and suggested future research
directions. First, given that some firms are very highly
diversified, the use of industry averages on firm-level data may
cloud the results. However, this is a problem faced by all
business policy researchers who use industry averages, difficult to
overcome in the absence of detailed business-level information in
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the public domain. Second, additional research is necessary to
ascertain that the significant results obtained here would hold
with the smaller samples defined by industry-specific research
questions or shorter time periods, and are not attributable to our
sample
.
Future research might investigate slack and acquisition in
specific industry settings or in particular time periods. It may
be that the influence of slack changes with fluctuating economic
conditions, and has differential effects on acquisition
dec is ion-making
.
CONCLUSION
This paper reports research which empirically tests
relationships that are well-specified and theoretically justified
in the literature. Prior research suggests that a relationship
between organizational slack and acquisition is likely, yet based
on our sample and data none is found. Although research papers
more frequently report tentative or wholehearted support for the
hypotheses they address, it is equally important to report research
results which fail to support suggested propositions and shared
assumptions which are firmly based in the existing research
1 i terature.
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TABLE 1
Variables and Sources
Var i able Calculat ion Compustat item U
ACQ
RE
DIV
LIQ
REC
INV
Acqu i s i t i on 129
Total Assets 6
Retained Earnings 36
Ne t Sales 12
Pref
.
tCom.Div idends (19 + 2 1)
Com.Equ i ty + Pref .Stock (60 t 130)
Cash+ST Invests . -Curr . L iab
.
(1-5)
Net Sales 12
Rece i vables 2
Ne t Sales 12
Inventories 3
Net Sales 12
SGA (Net Sales-Cost of Goods Sold
-Operating Income)
Net Sales
DE Long Term Debt
Com.Equity+Pref .Stock
PE Price
( 12-41-•13)
12
9
(60 + 130)
24
Earnings per share 58
TABLE 2
Correlation Coefficients
(Firm Compared to Prior Period)
RE .07
DIV .02 -.06
LIQ .08 . 15 -.11
REC -.03 .08 -.09 -. 48
INV -.03
. 13 -.00 -. 45 .22
SGA -.01 . 15 .08 -.05 .09 .09
DE -.02 -.05
. 29 -.18 .06 . 1 4 .08
PE -.00 .06 -.03 .00 -.00 .01 . 07 .02
ACQ RE DIV LIQ REC INV SGA DE
TABLE 3
Regression on Acquisition
(Firm Compared to Prior Period)
( 1 ) Avai lable Slack
Const .
.
067****
( . 006)1
(111.16)'
RE
b,
. 254*
( . 152)
(2.78)
DIV
b^
.672
( .759)
( .78)
LIQ
bj
. 303**
(.114)
(7.13)
DE
b,
PE
r =.009
F value 3 82***
(2) Potential
b b
.068****
( .006) 1
( 1 1 1 .75) L
Slack
b 7 £>s
-.015 .000
(.022) (.000)
( .51 ) ( .02)
r =.000
F value .26
(3) Available and Potential Slack
.
067****
( .006) 1
( 108. 16)*
b,
. 405**
( . 181 )
(5.02)
.855
( .795)
(1.16)
bj
. 276**
(.116)
(5.63)
b,
-.010
( .023)
( . 17)
-.000
( .000)
( .06)
r =.011
F val ue 2 . 74***
1 Standard error
2 F value
**** p =
*** p =
** p =
* p =
001
01
05
10
TABLE 4
Correlation Coefficients
(Firm Compared to Industry Average)
RE . 10
DIV .04 .04
LIQ .02 -. 15 -.00
DE -.06 -.24 .06 .21
PE .01 .03 .02 .00
ACQ RE DIV LIQ
.05
DE
TABLE 5
Regression on Acquisition
(Firm Compared to Industry Average)
( 1 ) Ava i lable Slack
Const .
bo
.
073****
( .003)*
(SS.72) U
RE DIV LIQ
b, bt. b 3
.440****. 887 .000
( . 124) ( .746) ( .000)
(12.60) (1.41) (1.97)
DE
b
PE
b
r =.011
F value 4.98***
(2) Potential
b„ b
.
067****
( .006)*
( 1 1 12)'
Slack
b 7
-
.
037**
( .016) (
(5.13) (
b/
.000
.000)
. 31 )
r =.004
F value 2.66*
(3) Available and Potential Slack
b. b / b j. b 3
.074**** .409*** .980 .000
( .008) 1 ( . 129) ( .749) ( .000)
(88. 46)"1" ( 10.01 ) (1.71) (2. 24)
b 7 bs
-.030* .000
(.017) (.000)
(3.15) ( . 17)
r = .014
F val ue 3 . 76***
* Standard error
1 F value
**** p =
*** p =
** p =
* p =
001
01
05
10





iECKMAN
UNDERY INC.
JUN95
. N MANCHES

